Operation Darind - A
Lightening Raid
Counter-Insurgency Operations in
Kashmir
By Yoginder Kandhari
Militants in Kashmir Valley always framed
their own rules of the combat game. Their
activities often subsided during winter months
as much for closure of passes as for severity of
cold. Unfortunately, security forces never
exploited this combat procrastination, on the
part of militants, so as to seize tactical
initiative which mostly sides with the later in
low intensity combat situations. Winter months
often gave one an impression of an undeclared
truce between the two sides, militants, on one
hand, staying away from combat out of tactical
compulsion of conserving manpower and material,
while, on the other hand, there would be a
virtual cessation of operations by security
forces with their higher echelons conspicuous by
their absence on ‘winter‘leave, almost en mass.
During winter months, combat management was left
to the wisdom of junior commanders who were
unwilling to take any chances since their
initiatives had been blunted by confused higher
commanders who refused to stand by their
subordinates in crisis situations conjured up by
the third dimension of insurgency, the human
rights bogey. It may be pertinent to mention
here that security forces often reaped handsome
dividends whenever they kept up momentum of
counter-insurgency operation through the winter
months. But such instances were very few to come
by and the raid launched by our troops in
village Darind is one such instance to
substantiate this observation.
The month
of February in year 1995 was no different since both climatic temperature and
militant activities had frozen. Even intelligence inputs, through formal
channels, had dried up. One could keep oneself abreast of only localized
militant activities and that too through local contacts. Our column of troops
was located at Zakura on Srinagar-Leh road. Right from the onset of militancy in
1990 and upto 1994, Zakura was only a summer location for troops tasked to keep
Srinagar-Leh road open for winter stocking in Leh sector. However, in 1994 we
were ordered to stay back in the area even after closure of Srinagar-Leh road
and were tasked to dominate the area during winter months. Our area of
responsibility included the highway stretch from Zakura to Nunar in the North
and the area to the east of this road stretch. Area to the west of the road was
under operational responsibility of Border Security Force. Our area included
notorious places like Ganderbal, Malshahi Bagh, Darind, Rangil and the
mountainous range to the east of the highway. In fact, domination of Ganderbal
was strategically vital since most infiltration routes passed through it and
militants were free to wander any where in the Valley provided they managed to
screen off their movement through this area. Quite naturally, Ganderbal, and the
areas around it, had a large presence of militants who would stage-manage smooth
transiting of militants by engaging security forces in frequent fire fights.
Needless to say that security forces would often party over a militant killed or
a weapon captured but would be blissfully ignorant of groups of heavily armed
militants sneaking past just under their very nose. Hence, it was essential to
neutralize the local cadres of militants if we were to upset their larger
design. Having been ordered to stay back in Zakura and with our combat
responsibilities defined, one got down to establishing a reliable intelligence
network in order to gain real time information about the militants.
Adjacent
to our location, in Zakura, was another column of troops whose area of
responsibility was to south of Zakura astride the highway. Commander of this
column, a gentle man from south India, faced enormous difficulties in
cultivating local sources for obvious reasons. That this column had no success
to show was no aspersion on its professional ability or sincerity. One could not
help but empathize with column commander’s dilemma and to assist him in all
possible ways. Initially, he was skeptical about my offers for combat leaders in
the Valley mostly wanted to ride on others’ shoulders to corner glory. One must
admit, to his credit, that he was quickly to discern sincerity in my offers and
readily agreed to coordinate our efforts in the larger interest. Initially, our
joint efforts did not yield results. In fact, militants would often get prior
information about our plans and pre-empt our raids or cordon operations. It did
not take us long to find out that a JCO of the neighboring column was a bit too
loud with our operational secrets. This compelled us to withhold operational
plans till the very last moment and the results started pouring in.
Intelligence inputs: One had been getting inputs from locals about presence
of section strength of Hizb -ul- Mujahideen (HM) militants comprising of their
commander and five others. Starved of funds from across the border during winter
months, this section had been on rampage to raise funds for Jihad. Locals were
fed up because of their persistent demands for cash. This precisely was the
reason why locals shared information with us. Ghulam Nabi, alias Sahib Dandana,
the section commander, belonged to a village atop the mountain range over
looking Rangil, Dardind and Malshahi Bagh. Sufi saint Baba Dariyadin’s Ziyarat
is located in this village. The village itself is known as Baba Dariyadin.
Though this village had a number of hideouts, yet these Jihadis would come down
to the foot hills in search of food and funds. They would normally enjoy the
morning sun in Rangil Water Works Complex (see sketch). Located on a high
ground, this Complex provided them domination, by observation, over the area. A
number of attempts by us to apprehend or eliminate these militants failed
because of this tactical advantage to militants. As soon as the troops would
peel off the highway on road to Rangil or Malshant Bagh, militants, forewarned
of our intentions, would melt into nearby villages. Naturally, we had to plan
with ingenuity to offset this tactical disadvantage.
Plan:
The plan envisaged a swift vehicle based movement by the sister column
through Rangil to raid the Water Works Complex. In conjunction with this
operation, my column was to undertake routine patrolling of the highway
towards Ganderbal and then turn back to launch a lightening raid in village
Dardind, hoping to catch fleeing militants unawares. In order to increase
chances of militants being channelized into village Darind consequent to raid on
Water Works Complex, a deception plan was conceived. Prior to actual operations
our two columns jointly dominated Rangil and Malshahi Bagh by raiding all known
militant hideouts therein and deliberately leaving village Darind untouched. A
local militant, belonging to Malshahi bagh, helped us in locating the hideouts
and he was to be used as ‘spotter’ during the intended operations. In order to
ensure that plan was not leaked out by overenthusiastic troops, I decided to
keep the plan to myself till the very last
Execution: February 4th, 1995 was selected as D-day. I called the
neighbouring commander a day before and requested him to launch a swift raid on
Rangil Water Work Complex the next day. In interest of secrecy, I withheld all
other operational details from him. At the appointed time, both the columns
moved out of their locations on respective missions. I retained radio control of
the joint mission. As planned, my columns moved towards Ganderbal area. To my
surprise, I found that another battalion had launched a cordon and search
operation in Ganderbal. That we had no prior information about this operation in
itself speaks volumes about poor coordination between various troops of same
organization; leave aside total absence of coordination between different
security agencies.
On
confirmation that other column had reached the target area, I requested him to
stay put in the Complex till further instructions. I turned back and wanted to
head straight for village Darind. On my way back, I was stopped by the troops
who had launched operation in Ganderbal. They requested assistance of my
‘spotter’. Reluctantly, I agreed to loan him for half an hour. In hindsight,
this delay turned out to be a blessing in disguise.
For the
final execution of the raid, I took on the wheels. Besides the ‘spotter’ my
personal security guard and driver were traveling in my vehicle. We were
followed by a heavier vehicle carrying a JCO and seven other ranks, all ready to
jump to action. As soon as I reached Darind junction, I speedily turned my
vehicle onto the track leading to Draind. I managed to speed through the muddy
village track. At the dead end of the village we spotted two militants, barely
five meters away from us, basking in the sun. Our delay at Ganderbal had helped
us by lulling these two Jihadis into a tactical complacency. Startled, both took
position behind an electric pole, aiming at us point blank. I accelerated my
vehicle and sped menacingly towards them in a bid to unnerve them and, hoping
like hell, to disturb their aim. This bold action worked. Instead of firing at
us they took to their heels. Before we could manage ourselves out of the
vehicle, one of them threw his weapon and vanished out of our sight. My driver
chased him leaving me stranded and unarmed in this hostile area. He had picked
my AK rifle from the vehicle in a flash. Later, it was revealed that my driver
had not collected his weapon before leaving the camp. Soon enough, I saw other
vehicle struggling up the slushy track. Subedar Sohan Lal, always an asset in a
combat situation, swiftly swung into action. He picked up the abandoned weapon
and fanned his troops to look for the second militant. Interestingly, inside a
house he discovered an innocent looking man panting heavily and engaged in
embroidery work. This aroused his suspicious. Spot frisking and snap
interrogation revealed him to be much sought after Gulam Nabi, the selection
commander. Besides apprehending him we also recovered two AK47 rifles, six AK
magazines, 162 live rounds and eight hand grenades. We launched a thorough
search for the second militant in the area but all in vain. He probably managed
to sneak out of our sight through numerous undulations in the ground. Having
abandoned his weapon, he in any case was a liability for his Tanzim. We gave up
the search. Sure enough, this militant was summarily executed by his own
colleagues for sowing timidity and for failure to pay up a huge amount for
losing his weapon.
With
Ghulam Nabi in our custody, we had a lot more to achieve which we did but I
reserve those details for some other time.
Source:
Kashmir
Sentinel
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