Omar's rehabilitation
Policy
Firming Up Insurgency and Separatism
By Yoginder Kandhari
Omar Abdullah, the Chief Minister of Jammu
and Kashmir, has announced that his government
intends to bring back ‘misguided’ Kashmiri youth
who have crossed over to Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK) and Pakistan, obviously for arms
training, during two decades of insurgency in
the Valley. He attempts to score a political
brownie point over the Mufti father-daughter
duo, his vociferous political opponents in the
Kashmir Valley. It may be recalled that a
proposal to bring ‘disillusioned’ Kashmiri youth
back to their homes had earlier been mooted by
the senior Mufti but then, rightly so, there
were no takers in the Union government for this
largesse to those who were waging a war against
the nation. However, this time both Omar and
Chidambaram claim to be on the same page albeit
the wrong one. What strategic foresight has
prompted centre to bite the Omar bait,
especially in the current surcharged security
scenario in the region, is anyone’s guess.
Interestingly, Nasir.A. Wani, a close friend of
the Chief Minister and also a minister in his
cabinet, has come out in support of Omar’s
rehabilitation policy by drawing a bizarre
analogy between the rehabilitation policy for
militants and that for the Kashmiri Pandits who
were forced into exile at gun point by these
very Omar’s ‘misguided’ boys.
In an attempt to steal some sheen out of Omar’s
latest move, separatists were quick to reject
‘surrender’ component of his proposal since it
would paint their cohorts as losers in the
ongoing Jihad to liberate Kashmir.
Strangely, Omar did a u-turn to re-christen his
dice as ‘rehabilitation only’ policy. One
wonders how insurgents can be rehabilitated
without handing over their arms and, more
importantly, abjuring cult of violence and
religious intolerance which they espouse. It all
points to a very disturbing scenario wherein
Omar, unwittingly, appears to be furthering
separatists’ agenda. Such a proposal, if
implemented, would adversely impact security,
political and social context in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir and the nation as a whole.
Security Implications
Current Security Scenario.
Of late, there has been a steep increase in the
number of encounters between militants and the
security forces in the State, stand off grenade
attacks and militancy related deaths. According
to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), this year
up, to 7th March, there already have
been 64 fatalities which include 43 terrorists,
14 security personnel and seven civilians. After
a gap of almost two years a fidayeen
attack took place at Lal Chowk, the heart of the
summer capital of the State. Infiltration by
terrorists from across the International Border
(IB) and Line of Control (LoC) in J&K is also on
the rise. According to official sources, year
2009 recorded 485 incidents of infiltration as
against 342 in 2008 thus registering an increase
of 30% while security agencies estimate that
more than 300 terrorists have crossed over to
this side. During first two months of this year,
militants made 25 attempts to infiltrate into
our side in conjunction with five ceasefire
violations by Pakistani forces, ostensibly to
cover infiltrations by some important militants
groups. As per available official data (up to
November 2009) 273 terrorists sneaked back to
Pakistan, 93 were killed during infiltration
attempts while 152 of them were neutralized
across the state. State government estimates
that about 600-800 terrorists are currently
operating in the State. These figures present a
gory scenario. To complicate the matters
further, in 2009, UPA government pulled out
30,000 troops from twin border districts of
Rajouri and Poonch leaving majority of 50
identified infiltration routes thinly guarded.
All these events do not foretell a rosy summer
for our security forces. At this juncture,
talking about the return of the youth, whose
faculties would sure have been Talibanized
to the last strand, from across the border will
be suicidal for our national interests.
A spate of public protests and
repeated incidents of stone pelting indicate
that the insurgency in the Valley has graduated
into a more complex phase manifesting
comprehensive assaults against the state
authority and mass mobilization campaigns, aptly
termed as ‘Agitational Terrorism’ by Lt. Gen. B.
S. Jamwal, General Officer Commanding- in- Chief
of Army’s Northern Command. Recently, Mr. N.
K.Tripathi, Special Director CRPF, Jammu &
Kashmir Zone, on February 2010, revealed how
terrorist regimes were crafting public
demonstrations and protests in conjunction with
focused violence. He added that Pakistan’s
covert agencies were hiring Kashmiris to pelt
stones on security forces. Ajaat Jamwal, in his
essay ‘From Terrorism to Agitational Terrorism
in Kashmir’ published in South Asia Intelligence
Review, says “Agitational terrorism is a far
more sophisticated phenomenon than is currently
being recognized by the authorities. Over ground
support structures of terrorism including
separatist and religious extremist political
formations, civil rights NGOs, media
organizations, subversive elements within the
Government, international organizations
operating from various countries in the West,
have all been cast into roles in this campaign.
Public protests and hertals (strikes)
have been transformed into an assault on the
credibility and symbols of the state.”
Impediments. From the
security stand point, challenges to implement
this policy would be manifold. Firstly, database
of the persons who have crossed over to the
other side of the border is not available with
any state agency. Even the figures projected by
the State government are vague and its estimate
ranges anything from 4,000 to 10,000. In such a
situation what stops ISI and Jihadists
from sending across battle ready terrorist via
this route especially since, in the words of M.J.
Akbar, a noted columnist, “….who has identified
the proposed prodigals as authentic? They did
not leave their names and address with the
Intelligence Bureau in Srinagar when they went
off to prepare for their holy war. There are no
special genetic traits that differentiate
Kashmiris on either side of LoC. The Pakistani
government did not control this lot directly.
They were outsourced to outfits like the
Jamaat-e-Islami and Lashkar-e-Toiba,
so only people who would know a genuine
cross-border warrior from a home grown one would
be Jamaat or LeT. Would Delhi
honour certificates handed out by LeT?”
It, indeed, is a valid argument.
Secondly, it is difficult to imagine
the type of mechanism that would be put in place
to ascertain whether there has been a genuine
change of heart among those craving to return
home. A mere plea by some of them to Omar
Abdullah, during his recent Pakistan visit, does
not certify their genuineness. Surrendering of
arms alone is not a guarantee that they would
not relapse into armed rebellion against the
state.
Thirdly, one can well imagine fatal
consequences of housing a pool of 4000 to 10000
fully trained and indoctrinated people amongst
our middle. We need to learn our lessons well
from recent history. Post independence, first
attempt to militarize separatist sentiment in
Kashmir was emergence of Al Fatah
immediately after the Sacred Relic Agitation in
1963 when massive protests were witnessed in the
Valley. It was for the first time that the
separatists in the Valley realized that there
existed a military option too to achieve their
goal. Pakistan launched its second mission in
1965 to annex Kashmir and she was banking on the
local support orchestrated by Al Fatah to
achieve her goal. As is history now, this
misadventure failed and Al Fatah had to
lie low for a long time. Subsequently, its cadre
was rehabilitated in the mainstream by the
successive governments in the State under the
pretext that it had abjured violence and the
separatist ideology. Some of its members were
absorbed in state apparatus thus enabling
separatists to institutionalize their struggle.
Their strategy was to join the system to wreck
it from within to achieve the ultimate goal. It
needs to be understood that the strong
foundations for the current armed insurgency was
laid by Al Fatah cadre entrenched within
the State establishment itself.
Consequences. One needs to place the
proposed rehabilitation policy in context of
current security situation in the Valley. With
an alarming rise in incidents of infiltration,
increase in militant encounters and agitational
terrorism gaining popular support,
rehabilitation of Omar’s boys may prove to a be
the catalyst to foment another massive upheaval
in the Valley leading to a powerful civil
struggle, as witnessed in early 1990s in Eastern
Europe, which would ultimately culminate in
secession of Kashmir from Indian Union. One only
hopes the political class and security think
tanks in New Delhi have factored in all these
possibilities before conceding to Omar’s move
unless some larger consensus has already been
arrived at.
Political & Social Implications
It is an established fact
that revival of the political process in the
State was greatly helped by the militants who
voluntarily surrendered to the security forces
and joined the mainstream. Despite severe
reprisal against their families and relatives by
militant organizations these genuinely reformed
militants remained steadfast in their commitment
to Indian nation and helped her re-establishing
its authority in the State. Unfortunately, such
people have been forsaken both by the Sate and
the Central governments. Without any patronage
from the very state that they helped
re-establish its authority, a large number of
them and their kith and kin were killed or
threatened with dire consequences so much so
that most of them had to shift their families
out of the Valley and in many cases out of the
State. One fails to understand why Omar Abdullah
or Chidambaram have not cared to rehabilitate
them before seeking amnesty for those who are
still in Pakistan and whose credentials are yet
to be established. Obviously, there is a
compulsion to fast track rehabilitation of those
who are still armed and discard those who
abjured violence long back and proved beyond any
doubt their loyalty to the nation.
Equating latest rehabilitation
policy with the rehabilitation schemes drawn for
Kashmiri Pandits is a weird justification. Mr.
Wani must remember that Kashmiri Pandits did not
take up arms against the state nor did they go
to Pakistan for any training. He is trivializing
a human tragedy caused by the very people whose
case he is pleading. Such a comparison has
serious undertones and should not be considered
as political naivety. Given Wani’s proximity to
the Chief Minister, it appears that the Sate
government wants to project Omar’s boys as
victims of militancy- they could have suffered
only at the hands of security forces- and
internationally displaced people as a
consequence. It is an attempt to
internationalize this issue and that can have
serious ramifications.
Conclusion.
Return of Omar’s prodigals is bound to reignite
secessionist urge within the Valley. They would
constitute a viable force to reinforce mass
uprising in conjunction with a vigorous armed
struggle for Kashmir to wither from India. It
would be a sure-shot recipe to firm up
insurgency and the separatist sentiment in the
Valley. May be it is time for people who matter
in New Delhi to wake up.
Source:
Kashmir
Sentinel
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